fewer people would die if they did.
Greene found that the brains of subjects who gave the non-utilitarian response -not to push the fat man -in this case showed increased activation in regions associated with emotion, whereas the brains of the rarer utilitarian responders were activated in areas associated with working memory and reasoning. This finding has been interpreted as support for utilitarianism, the theory supposedly reflective of more rational cognitive processes. Others dispute this. In a recent study by Michael Koenig and colleagues, patients with damage in brain areas involved in the normal generation of social emotions were more likely to select a utilitarian response. One can imagine ways of spinning this result that would be less flattering to the utilitarian.
Other investigations focus on behaviour. Dropping your papers outside a phone booth in a shopping mall, you are much more likely to get help from passers-by if they have just found money in the phone's coin-return slot, according to one study. Placing a coin in the slot increased the proportion of people who stopped to help, from almost nobody to almost everybody. You are also much more likely to get change for a note from a passer-by if standing near a fragrant bakery shop than outside a "neutral-smelling dry-goods store". Many studies have confirmed that morally irrelevant features have a strong effect on whether people offer help. Some have even concluded that character is a myth: it is the situation, rather than any stable personality trait, that determines whether one does the right thing. If true, this claim poses a big challenge to aristotelian ethics, which is built on the idea that we ought to cultivate a virtuous character. However, causes can be multifactorial: the fact that situational features often have a big influence does not imply that character never has any influence. It is probably a question of degree.
Psychologists have also sought to identify the basic 'taste buds' of our moral sensibilities. Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, proposes we have a limited number of distinct moral modules, which get activated in response to different kinds of moral problems. Haidt's taxonomy distinguishes responses related to harm, fairness and reciprocity, hierarchy and respect, purity and pollution, in-group and out-group boundaries, and awe and elevation. If we do have all these sensibilities, one might suspect that moral theories that recognize or privilege only one or two of them are unduly restricted.
Experiments in Ethics is erudite, concise
Music grown from garden weeds and engagingly written. Appiah assesses that experimental science is relevant to the enterprise of normative ethics, and that the relation between the two, although complex, need not be antagonistic. Returning to my analogy, Appiah recommends that our labcoated gatecrasher enter into a dialogue with the party-goers, and that they should welcome Science into their midst. The nine Muses of music and the arts should also be invited. Seeing the central issue of ethics as eudemonia, the good life, Appiah believes that such a plenary gathering will best enable both its study and its achievement. 
